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Chapter 10
Physical Unknowables
Karl Svozil
As we know, there are known knowns;
there are things we know we know.
We also know there are known unknowns;
that is to say we know there are some things we do not know.
But there are also unknown unknowns –
the ones we don’t know we don’t know.
– United States Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld
at a Department of Defense news briefing on February 12, 2002
Ei mihi, qui nescio saltem quid nesciam!
(Alas for me, that I do not at least know the extent of my own
ignorance!)
– Aurelius Augustinus, 354–430, “Confessiones” (Book XI,
chapter 25)
10.1 Rise and fall of determinism
In what follows, a variety of physical unknowables will be discussed.
Provable lack of physical omniscience, omnipredictability and om-
nipotence is derived by reduction to problems that are known to
be recursively unsolvable. “Chaotic” symbolic dynamical systems
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are unstable with respect to variations of initial states. Quantum
unknowables include the random occurrence of single events, com-
plementarity, and value indefiniteness.
From antiquity onward, various waves of (in)determinism have
influenced human thought. Regardless of whether they were shaped
by some Zeitgeist, or whether, as Goethe’s Faust puts it, “what
you the Spirit of the Ages call, is nothing but the spirit of you
all, wherein the Ages are reflected,” their proponents have some-
times vigorously defended their stance in irrational, unscientific,
and ideologic ways. Indeed, from an emotional point of view, may
it not appear frightening to be “imprisoned” by remorseless, relent-
less predetermination, even in a dualistic setup (Descartes, 1641);
and, equally frightening, to accept that one’s fate depends on to-
tal arbitrariness and chance? Does determinism expose freedom,
self-determination and human dignity as an idealistic illusion? On
the other extreme, what kind of morale, merits and efforts appear
worthy in a universe governed by pure chance? Is there some rea-
sonable in-between straddling those extreme positions that may also
be consistent with science?
We shall, for the sake of separating the scientific debate from
emotional overtones and possible bias, adopt a contemplative strat-
egy of evenly-suspended attention outlined by Freud (1999), who
admonishes analysts to be aware of the dangers caused by “tempta-
tions to project, what [the analyst] in dull self-perception recognizes
as the peculiarities of his own personality, as generally valid theory
into science.” Nature is thereby treated as a client-patient, and
whatever findings come up are accepted as is without any immedi-
ate emphasis or judgment.
10.1.1 Toward explanation and feasibility
Throughout history, the human desire to foresee and manipulate
the physical world for survival and prosperity, and in accord with
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personal wishes and fantasies, has been confronted with the inabil-
ity to predict and manipulate large portions of the habitat. As time
passed, people have figured out various ways to tune ever increasing
fragments of the world according to their needs. From a purely be-
havioral perspective, this is brought about in the way of pragmatic
quasi-causal conditional rules of the following kind, “if one does this,
one obtains that.” A typical example of such a rule is “if I rub my
hands, they get warmer.”
How does one arrive at those kinds of rules? Guided by suspi-
cions, thoughts, formalisms and by pure chance, inquiries start by
roaming around, inspecting portions of the world and examining
their behavior. Repeating phenomena or patterns of behavior are
observed and pinned down by reproducing and evoking them. A
physical behavior is anything that can be observed and thus opera-
tionally obtained and measured; for example, the rise and fall of the
sun, the ignition of fire, the formation and melting of ice (in princi-
ple even time series of financial entities traded at stock exchanges
or over-the-counter).
As physical behaviors are observed, people attempt to under-
stand them by trying to figure out some cause (Schlick, 1932; Frank,
1932) or reason for their occurrences. Researchers invent virtual
parallel worlds of thoughts and intellectual concepts such as “electric
field” or “mechanical force” to explain and manipulate the physical
behaviors, calling these creations of their minds “physical theories.”
Contemporary physical theories are heavily formalized and spelled
out in the language of mathematics. A good theory provides people
with the feeling of a key unlocking new ways of world comprehension
and manipulation. Ideally, an explanation should be as compact as
possible and should apply to as many behavioral patterns as possi-
ble.
Ultimately, theories of everything (Schlick, 1935; Barrow, 1991;
Kragh, 1999) should be able to predict and manipulate all phe-
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nomena. In the extreme form, science becomes omniscient and om-
nipotent, and we envision ourselves almost as becoming empowered
with magic: we presume that our ability to manipulate and tune the
world is limited by our fantasies alone, and any constraints what-
soever can be bypassed or overcome one way or another. Indeed,
some of what in the past has been called “supernatural,” “mystery,”
and “the beyond” has been realized in everyday life. Many wonders
of witchcraft have been transferred into the realm of the physical
sciences. Take, for example, our abilities to fly, to transmute mer-
cury into gold (Sherr et al., 1941), to listen and speak to far away
friends, or to cure bacterial diseases with a few pills of antibiotics.
Until about 1900, the fast-growing natural sciences, guided by
rational (Descartes, 1637) and empirical (Locke, 1690; Hume, 1748)
thinking, and seconded by the European Enlightenment, prospered
under the assumption of physical determinism. Under the aegis
of physical determinism, all incapacities to predict and manipulate
physical behavior were interpreted to be merely epistemic in nature,
purporting that, with growing precision of measurements and im-
provements of theory, all physical unknowables will eventually be
overcome and turned into knowables; that is, everything should in
principle be knowable. Even statistical quantities would describe
underlying deterministic behaviors. Consequently, there could not
exist any physical behavior or entity without a cause stimulating or
pushing it into existence.
The uprise of determinism culminated in the following statement
by Laplace (1998, chap. 2):
Present events are connected with preceding ones by a
tie based upon the evident principle that a thing cannot
occur without a cause which produces it. This axiom,
known by the name of the principle of sufficient reason,
extends even to actions which are considered indifferent
. . .
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We ought then to regard the present state of the universe
as the effect of its anterior state and as the cause of
the one which is to follow. Given for one instant an
intelligence which could comprehend all the forces by
which nature is animated and the respective situation
of the beings who compose it an intelligence sufficiently
vast to submit these data to analysis it would embrace in
the same formula the movements of the greatest bodies
of the universe and those of the lightest atom; for it,
nothing would be uncertain and the future, as the past,
would be present to its eyes.
The invention of (analytic) functions reflects this paradigm quite
nicely: some dispersionless point coordinate x(t) of infinite precision
serves as the representation (Hertz, 1894) of a physical state as a
(unique) function of physical time t.
Indeed, the possibility to formulate theories per se, and in par-
ticular, the applicability of formal, mathematical models, comes as
a mind-boggling surprise and cannot be taken for granted; there
appears to be what Wigner (1960) called an “unreasonable effec-
tiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences.” Even today, there
is a Pythagorean consensus that there is no limit to dealing with
physical entities in terms of mathematical formalism. And, as math-
ematics increasingly served as a proper representation of reality,
and computational deduction systems were increasingly introduced
to delineate formalizable truth, algorithmics started to become a
metaphor for physics. In algorithmic terms, nature computes, and
can be (re)programmed to perform certain tasks.
The natural sciences continued to be uninhibited by any sense
of limits until about fin-de-siècle, around 1900. In parallel, the
formalization of mathematics progressed in an equally uninhibited
way. Hilbert (1926, 170) argued that nobody should ever expel
mathematicians from the paradise created by Cantor’s set theory
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and posed a challenge (Hilbert, 1902) to search for a consistent,
finite system of formal axioms which would be able to render all
mathematical and physical truths; just like quasi-finitistic ways to
cope with infinitesimal calculus had been found.
This type of belief system that claims omniscience could be
called “deterministic conjecture” because no proof for its validity
can be given, nor is there any way of falsification (Popper, 1959).
Alas, from a pragmatic point of view, omniscience can be effectively
disproved on a daily basis by tuning in to local weather forecasts.
Furthermore, it seems to be an enduring desire of human nature
to be able not merely to trust the rules and theories syntactically
and operationally (Bridgman, 1934) but also to be able to seman-
tically interpret them as implying and carrying some ontological
significance or truth – as if reality would communicate with us, me-
diated through our senses, thereby revealing the laws governing na-
ture. Stated pointedly, we not only wish to accept physical theories
as pure abstractions and constructions of our own mind (Berkeley,
1710) but we associate meaning and truth to them so much so that
only very reluctantly do we admit their preliminary, transient, and
changing character (Lakatos, 1978).
10.1.2 Rise of indeterminism
Almost unnoticed, the tide of indeterminism started to build to-
ward the end of the nineteenth century (Purrington, 1997; Kragh,
1999). At that time, mechanistic theories faced an increasing num-
ber of anomalies: Poincaré’s discovery of instabilities of trajectories
of celestial bodies (which made them extremely sensible to initial
conditions), radioactivity (Kragh, 1997, 2009), X-rays, specific heats
of gases and solids, emission and absorption of light (in particular,
blackbody radiation), the (ir)reversibility dichotomy between clas-
sical reversible mechanics and Boltzmann’s statistical-mechanical
theory of entropy versus the second law of thermodynamics, and
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the experimental refutation of classical constructions of the ether
as a medium for the propagation of light waves.
After the year 1900 followed a short period of revolutionary
new physics, in particular, quantum theory and relativity theory,
without any strong inclination toward (in)determinism. Then inde-
terminism erupted with Born’s claim that quantum mechanics has
it both ways: the quantum state evolves strictly deterministically,
whereas the individual event or measurement outcome occurs inde-
terministically. Born also stated that he believed that there is no
cause for an individual quantum event; that is, such an outcome
occurs irreducibly at random.
There followed a fierce controversy, with many researchers such
as Born, Bohr, Heisenberg, and Pauli taking the indeterministic
stance, whereas others, like Planck (Born, 1955), Einstein (Einstein
et al., 1935; Einstein, 1938), Schrödinger, and De Brogli, leaning
toward determinism. This latter position was pointedly put forward
by Einstein’s dictum in a letter to Born, dated December 12, 1926
(Born, 1969, 113): “In any case I am convinced that he [the Old One]
does not throw dice.” At present, indeterminism is clearly favored,
the canonical position being expressed by Zeilinger (2005): “The
discovery that individual events are irreducibly random is probably
one of the most significant findings of the twentieth century. . . . For
the individual event in quantum physics, not only do we not know
the cause, there is no cause.”
The last quarter of the twentieth century saw the rise of yet
another form of physical indeterminism, originating in Poincaré’s
aforementioned discovery of instabilities of the motion of classical
bodies against variations of initial conditions (Campbell & Gar-
nett, 1882; Poincaré, 1914; Diacu & Holmes, 1996). This scenario
of deterministic chaos resulted in a plethora of claims regarding
indeterminism that resonated with a general public susceptible to
fables and fairy tales (Bricmont, 1996).
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In parallel, Gödel’s incompleteness theorems (Gödel, 1931;
Tarski, 1932; Davis, 1958, 1965; Smullyan, 1992a), as well as re-
lated findings in the computer sciences (Turing, 1937; Chaitin,
1987a; Calude, 2002; Grünwald & Vitányi, 1987), put an end to
Hilbert’s program of finding a finite axiom system for all mathe-
matics. Gödel’s incompleteness theorems also established formal
bounds on provability, predictability, and induction. (The incom-
pleteness theorems also put an end to philosophical contentions ex-
pressed by Schlick (1935, 101) that, beyond epistemic unknowables
and the “essential incompetence of human knowledge,” there is “not
a single real question for which it would be logically impossible to
find a solution.”)
Alas, just like determinism, physical indeterminism cannot be
proved, nor can there be given any reasonable criterion for its fal-
sification. After all, how can one check against all laws and find
none applicable? Unless one is willing to denote any system whose
laws are currently unknown or whose behavior is hard to predict
with present techniques as indeterministic, there is no scientific sub-
stance to such absolute claims, especially if one takes into account
the bounds imposed by the theory of recursive functions discussed
later. So, just as in the deterministic case, this position should be
considered conjectural.
In discussing the present status of physical (in)determinism, we
shall first consider provable unknowables through reduction to in-
completeness theorems of recursion theory, then discuss classical de-
terministic chaos, and finally deal with the three types of quantum
indeterminism: the occurrence of certain single events, complemen-
tarity, and value indefiniteness. The latter quantum unknowables
are not commonly accepted by the entire community of physicists;
a minority is still hoping for a more complete quantum theory than
the present statistical theory.
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10.2 Provable physical unknowables
In the past century, unknowability has been formally defined and
derived in terms of a precise, formal notion of unprovability (Gödel,
1931; Tarski, 1932, 1956; Turing, 1937; Rogers, Jr., 1967; Davis,
1958; Odifreddi, 1989; Smullyan, 1992a). This is a remarkable de-
parture from informal suspicions and observations regarding the
limitations of our worldview. No longer is one reduced to informal,
heuristic contemplations and comparisons about what one knows
and can do versus one’s ignorance and incapability. Formal un-
knowability is about formal proofs of unpredictability and impossi-
bility.
There are several pathways to formal undecidability. For con-
temporaries accustomed to computer programs (and their respective
codes), a straight route may be algorithmic. What is an algorithm?
In Turing’s (1968, 34) own words,
a man provided with paper, pencil and rubber, and sub-
ject to strict discipline [carrying out a set of rules of
procedure written down] is in effect a universal com-
puter.
From a purely syntactic point of view, formal systems in mathemat-
ics can be identified with computations and vice versa. Indeed, as
stated by Gödel (1986, 369-370) in a postscript, dated from June 3,
1964:
due to A. M. Turing’s work, a precise and unquestion-
ably adequate definition of the general concept of formal
system can now be given, the existence of undecidable
arithmetical propositions and the non-demonstrability
of the consistency of a system in the same system can
now be proved rigorously for every consistent formal sys-
tem containing a certain amount of finitary number the-
ory.
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Turing’s work gives an analysis of the concept of “me-
chanical procedure” (alias “algorithm” or “computation
procedure” or “finite combinatorial procedure”). This
concept is shown to be equivalent with that of a “Tur-
ing machine.” A formal system can simply be defined
to be any mechanical procedure for producing formulas,
called provable formulas.
Almost since its discovery, attempts (Popper, 1950a,b) have
been made to translate formal incompleteness into physics, mostly
by reduction to some provable undecidable problem of recursion
theory such as the halting problem (Wolfram, 1984; Kanter, 1990;
Moore, 1990; Wolfram, 1985; Costa & Doria, 1991; da Costa & Do-
ria, 1991; Suppes, 1993; Svozil, 1993; Hole, 1994; Casti & Traub,
1994; Casti & Karlquist, 1996; Barrow, 1998). Here the term re-
duction indicates that physical undecidability is linked or reduced
to logical undecidability. A typical example is the embedding of
a Turing machine or any type of computer capable of universal
computation into a physical system. As a consequence, the physi-
cal system inherits any type of unsolvability derivable for universal
computers such as the unsolvability of the halting problem: because
the computer is part of the physical system, so are its behavioral
patterns [and vice versa (Bridgman, 1934; Landauer, 1986, 1991)].
Note that these logical and recursion-theoretical types of phys-
ical unknowables are only derivable within deterministic sys-
tems that are strong enough to express self-reference, substitution
(Smullyan, 1992a, chap. 1), and universal computation. Indetermin-
istic systems are not deterministic by definition, and too-weak forms
of expressibility are trivially incomplete (Brukner, 2003), as they are
incapable of expressing universal computation or self-reference and
substitution.
Gödel himself did not believe that his incompleteness theorems
had any relevance for physics, especially not for quantum mechanics.
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The author was told by professor Wheeler that Gödel’s resentments
[also mentioned in Bernstein (1991, 140–141)] may have been due to
Einstein’s negative opinion about quantum theory, because Einstein
may have brainwashed Gödel into believing that all efforts in this
direction were in vain.
10.2.1 Intrinsic self-referential observers
Embedded (Toffoli, 1978), intrinsic observers (Svozil, 1994) cannot
leave their Cartesian prison (Descartes, 1641, Meditation 1.12) and
step outside the universe examining it from some Archimedean point
(Boskovich, 1966, sect. 11, 405–409). Thus every physical observa-
tion is reflexive (Nagel, 1986; Sosa, 2009) and circular (Kauffman,
1987). The self-referential and substitution capability of observers
results in very diverse, unpredictable forms of behavior and in prov-
able unknowables.
For the sake of the further analysis, suppose that there exist
observers measuring objects and that observers and objects are dis-
tinct from one another, separated by a cut. Through that cut,
information is exchanged. Symbolically, we may regard the object
as an agent contained in a black box, whose only relevant emana-
tions are representable by finite strings of zeroes and ones appearing
on the cut, which can be modeled by any kind of screen or display.
According to this purely syntactic point of view, a physical theory
should be able to render identical symbols like the ones appearing
through the cut; that is, a physical theory should be able to mimic
or emulate the black box to which it purports to apply. This view is
often adapted in quantum mechanics (Fuchs & Peres, 2000), where
the question regarding any meaning of the quantum formalism is
notorious (Feynman, 1965, 129).
A sharp distinction between a physical object and an extrin-
sic outside observer is a rarely affordable abstraction. Mostly the
observer is part of the system to be observed. In such cases, the
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measurement process is modeled symmetrically, and information is
exchanged between observer and object bidirectionally. This sym-
metrical configuration makes a distinction between observer and
object purely conventional (Svozil, 2002a). The cut is constituted
by the information exchanged. We tend to associate with the mea-
surement apparatus one of the two subsystems that, in comparison,
is larger, more classical, and up-linked with some conscious observer
(Wigner, 1961). The rest of the system can then be called the mea-
sured object.
Intrinsic observers face all kinds of paradoxical self-referential
situations. These have been expressed informally as puzzling amuse-
ment and artistic perplexity, and as a formalized, scientifically valu-
able resource. The liar paradox, for instance, is already mentioned
in the Bible’s Epistle to Titus 1:12, stating that “one of Crete’s own
prophets has said it: ‘Cretans are always liars, evil brutes, lazy glut-
tons.’ He has surely told the truth.” In what follows, paradoxical
self-referentiality will be applied to argue against the solvability of
the general induction problem as well as for a pandemonium of un-
decidabilities related to physical systems and their behaviors. All
are based on intrinsic observers embedded in the systems they ob-
serve.
It is not totally unreasonable to speculate that the limits of
intrinsic self-expression seems to be what Gödel himself considered
the gist of his incompleteness theorems. In a reply to a letter by
Burks [reprinted in von Neumann (1966, 55); see also Feferman
(1984, 554)], Gödel states:
that a complete epistemological description of a lan-
guage A cannot be given in the same language A, be-
cause the concept of truth of sentences of A cannot be
defined in A. It is this theorem which is the true rea-
son for the existence of undecidable propositions in the
formal systems containing arithmetic.
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One of the first researchers to become interested in the appli-
cation of paradoxical self-reference to physics was the philosopher
Popper (1950a,b) who published two almost forgotten papers dis-
cussing, among other issues, Russell’s paradox of Tristram Shandy
(Sterne, 1767): In volume 1, chapter 14, Shandy finds that he could
publish two volumes of his life every year, covering a time span far
shorter than the time it took him to write these volumes. This
de-synchronization, Shandy concedes, will rather increase than di-
minish as he advances; one may thus have serious doubts about
whether he will ever complete his autobiography. This relates to a
question of whether there can be a physical computer that can be
assured of correctly processing information faster than the universe
does. Wolpert (2001, 016128-1) states that [see also Calude et al.
(1995, sect. 5)] “In a certain sense, the universe is more powerful
than any information-processing system constructed within it could
be. This result can alternatively be viewed as a restriction on the
computational power of the universe – the universe cannot support
the existence within it of a computer that can process information
as fast as it can.”
10.2.2 Unpredictability
For any deterministic system strong enough to support universal
computation, the general forecast or prediction problem is provable
unsolvable. This proposition will be argued by reduction to the
halting problem, which is provable unsolvable. A straightforward
embedding of a universal computer into a physical system results in
the fact that, owing to the reduction to the recursive undecidability
of the halting problem, certain future events cannot be predicted
and are thus provable indeterministic. Here reduction again means
that physical undecidability is linked or reduced to logical undecid-
ability.
A clear distinction should be made between determinism (such
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as computable evolution laws) and predictability (Suppes, 1993). De-
terminism does not exclude unpredictability in the long run. The lo-
cal (temporal), step-by-step evolution of the system can be perfectly
deterministic and computable, whereas recursion-theoretic unknow-
ables correspond to global observables at unbounded time scales.
Indeed, (nontrivial) provable unpredictability requires determinism,
because formalized proofs require formal systems or algorithmic be-
havior.
Unpredictability in indeterministic systems is tautological and
trivial. At the other extreme, one should also keep in mind
that there exist rather straightforward pre-Gödelian impossibilities
(Brukner, 2003) to express certain mathematical truths in weak
systems that are incapable of representing universal computation
or Peano arithmetic.
For the sake of exploring (algorithmically) what paradoxical self-
reference is like, one can consider the sketch of a proof by contra-
diction of the unsolvability of the halting problem. The halting
problem is about whether or not a computer will eventually halt
on a given input, that is, will evolve into a state indicating the
completion of a computation task or will stop altogether. Stated
differently, a solution of the halting problem will be an algorithm
that decides whether another arbitrary algorithm on arbitrary input
will finish running or will run forever.
The scheme of the proof by contradiction is as follows: the ex-
istence of a hypothetical halting algorithm capable of solving the
halting problem will be assumed. This could, for instance, be a
subprogram of some suspicious supermacro library that takes the
code of an arbitrary program as input and outputs 1 or 0, depend-
ing on whether or not the program halts. One may also think of
it as a sort of oracle or black box analyzing an arbitrary program
in terms of its symbolic code and outputting one of two symbolic
states, say, 1 or 0, referring to termination or nontermination of the
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input program, respectively.
On the basis of this hypothetical halting algorithm one constructs
another diagonalization program as follows: on receiving some ar-
bitrary input program code as input, the diagonalization program
consults the hypothetical halting algorithm to find out whether or
not this input program halts; on receiving the answer, it does the
opposite: If the hypothetical halting algorithm decides that the in-
put program halts, the diagonalization program does not halt (it
may do so easily by entering an infinite loop). Alternatively, if the
hypothetical halting algorithm decides that the input program does
not halt, the diagonalization program will halt immediately.
The diagonalization program can be forced to execute a para-
doxical task by receiving its own program code as input. This is
so because, by considering the diagonalization program, the hypo-
thetical halting algorithm steers the diagonalization program into
halting if it discovers that it does not halt; conversely, the hypothet-
ical halting algorithm steers the diagonalization program into not
halting if it discovers that it halts.
The contradiction obtained in applying the diagonalization pro-
gram to its own code proves that this program and, in particular,
the hypothetical halting algorithm cannot exist. A slightly revised
form of the proof (using quantum diagonalizaton operators that
are equivalent to a classical derangement or subfactorial) holds for
quantum diagonalization (Svozil, 2009b), as quantum information
could be in a fifty-fifty fixed-point halting state. Procedurally, in
the absence of any fixed-point halting state, the aforemetioned task
might turn into a nonterminating alteration of oscillations between
halting and nonhalting states (Kauffman, 1987).
A universal computer can in principle be embedded into, or re-
alized by, certain physical systems designed to universally compute.
An example of such a physical system is the computer on which I
am currently typing this chapter. Assuming unbounded space [i.e.,
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memory (Calude & Staiger, 2010)] and time, it follows by reduction
(Wolfram, 1984; Kanter, 1990; Moore, 1990; Wolfram, 1985; Costa
& Doria, 1991; da Costa & Doria, 1991; Suppes, 1993; Svozil, 1993;
Hole, 1994; Casti & Traub, 1994; Calude et al., 1995; Casti & Kar-
lquist, 1996; Barrow, 1998) that there exist physical observables,
in particular, forecasts about whether or not an embedded com-
puter will ever halt in the sense sketched earlier, that are provably
undecidable.
10.2.3 The busy beaver function as the maximal
recurrence time
The busy beaver function (Rado, 1962; Chaitin, 1974; Dewdney,
1984; Brady, 1988) addresses the following question: suppose one
considers all programs (on a particular computer) up to length (in
terms of the number of symbols) n. What is the largest number pro-
ducible by such a program before halting? (Note that non-halting
programs, possibly producing an infinite number, e.g., by a non-
terminating loop, do not apply.) This number may be called the
busy beaver function of n. The first values of a certain universal com-
puter’s busy beaver function with two states and n symbols are, for
n = 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8, known to be, or estimated by (Dewdney,
1984; Brady, 1988), 4, 6, 13, greater than 103, greater than 104, and
greater than 1044.
Consider a related question: what is the upper bound of running
time – or, alternatively, recurrence time – of a program of length n
bits before terminating or, alternatively, recurring? An answer to
this question will explain just how long we have to wait for the most
time-consuming program of length n bits to halt. That, of course,
is a worst-case scenario. Many programs of length n bits will have
halted long before the maximal halting time. We mention without
proof (Chaitin, 1974, 1987b) that this bound can be represented by
the busy beaver function.
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Knowledge of the maximal halting time would solve the halting
problem quantitatively because if the maximal halting time were
known and bounded by any computable function of the program
size of n bits, one would have to wait just a little longer than the
maximal halting time to make sure that every program of length
n – also this particular program, if it is destined for termination –
has terminated. Otherwise, the program would run forever. Hence,
because of the recursive unsolvability of the halting problem the
maximal halting time cannot be a computable function. Indeed,
for large values of n, the maximal halting time explodes and grows
faster than any computable function of n.
By reduction, upper bounds for the recurrence of any kind of
physical behavior can be obtained; for deterministic systems repre-
sentable by n bits, the maximal recurrence time grows faster than
any computable number of n. This bound from below for possible
behaviors may be interpreted quite generally as a measure of the
impossibility to predict and forecast such behaviors by algorithmic
means.
10.2.4 Undecidability of the induction problem
Induction, in physics, is the inference of general rules dominating
and generating physical behaviors from these behaviors alone. For
any deterministic system strong enough to support universal com-
putation, the general induction problem is provable unsolvable. In-
duction is thereby reduced to the unsolvability of the rule inference
problem (Gold, 1967; Blum & Blum, 1975; Angluin & Smith, 1983;
Adleman & Blum, 1991; Li & Vitányi, 1992) of identifying a rule or
law reproducing the behavior of a deterministic system by observ-
ing its input-output performance by purely algorithmic means (not
by intuition).
Informally, the algorithmic idea of the proof is to take any suf-
ficiently powerful rule or method of induction and, by using it, to
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define some functional behavior that is not identified by it. This
amounts to constructing an algorithm which (passively) fakes the
guesser by simulating some particular function until the guesser
pretends to be able to guess the function correctly. In a second, di-
agonalization step, the faking algorithm then switches to a different
function to invalidate the guesser’s guess.
One can also interpret this result in terms of the recursive un-
solvability of the halting problem, which in turn is related to the
busy beaver function; there is no recursive bound on the time the
guesser has to wait to make sure that the guess is correct.
10.2.5 Impossibility
Physical tasks which would result in paradoxical behavior (Hilbert,
1926) are impossible to perform. One such task is the solution of
the general halting problem, as discussed earlier. Thus omnipotence
appears infeasible, at least as long as one sticks to the usual formal
rules opposing inconsistencies (Hilbert, 1926, 163).
Another such paradoxical task (requiring substitution and self-
reference) can be forced upon La Bocca della Veritá (Mouth of
Truth), located in the portico of the church of Santa Maria in
Cosmedin in Rome. It is believed that if one tells a lie with one’s
hand in the mouth of the sculpture, the hand will be bitten off;
another less violent legend has it that anyone sticking a hand in the
mouth while uttering a false statement will never be able to pull the
hand back out. Rucker (1982, 178) once allegedly put in his hand in
the sculpture’s mouth uttering, “I will not be able to pull my hand
back out.” The author leaves it to the reader to imagine La Bocca
della Veritá’s confusion when confronted with such as statement!
There is a pandemonium of conceivable physical tasks (Barrow,
1998), some quite entertaining (Smullyan, 1992b), which would re-
sult in paradoxical behavior and are thus impossible to perform.
Some of these tasks are pre-Gödelian and merely require substitu-
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tion.
For the sake of demonstrating paradoxical substitution and
the resulting impossibility, consider the following printing task
discussed by Smullyan (1992a, 2–4). Let the expressions (not),
(printable), (self-substitute), have a standard interpretation
in terms of negation, printing, and self-reference by substitu-
tion [i.e., if X is some expression formed by the earlier three
expressions and brackets, then (self-substitute)(X) = X(X)],
respectively, and define (not)(printable)(X) for arbitray ex-
pressions X to be true if and only if X cannot be printed.
Likewise, (not)(printable)(self-substitute)(X) is defined to be true
if and only if (self-substitute)X cannot be printed. Whatever
the rules deriving expressions (subject to the notion of truth
defined earlier) may be, as long as the system is consistent and
produces only true propositions (and no false ones), within this
small system, the following proposition is true but unprintable:
(not)(printable)(self-substitute)[(not)(printable)(self-substitute)].
By definition, this proposition is true if and only if (self-
substitute)[(not)(printable)(self-substitute)] cannot be printed. As
per definition, (self-substitute)[(not)(printable)(self-substitute)]
is just (not)(printable)(self-substitute)[(not)(printable)(self-
substitute)], the proposition is true if and only if it is not
printable. Thus the proposition is either true and cannot be
printed, or it is printable and thus false. The latter alterna-
tive is excluded by the assumption of consistency. Thus one
is left with the only consistent alternative that the proposition
(not)(printable)(self-substitute)[(not)(printable)(self-substitute)]
is true but unprintable. Note also that, since its negation
(printable)(self-substitute)[(not)(printable)(self-substitute)] is
false, it is also not printable (by the consistency assumption), and
hence (printable)(self-substitute)[(not)(printable)(self-substitute)]
is an example of a proposition which is undecidable within the
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system – neither it nor its negation will ever be printed in a
consistent formalized system with the notion of truth defined
earlier.
10.2.6 Results in classical recursion theory with
implications for theoretical physics
The following theorems of recursive analysis (Aberth, 1980;
Weihrauch, 2000) have some implications for theoretical physics
(Kreisel, 1974): (1) There exist recursive monotone bounded se-
quences of rational numbers whose limit is no computable number
(Specker, 1949). A concrete example of such a number is Chaitin’s
Omega number (Chaitin, 1987a; Calude, 2002; Calude & Dinneen,
2007), the halting probability for a computer (using prefix-free
code), which can be defined by a sequence of rational numbers with
no computable rate of convergence. (2) There exist a recursive real
function which has its maximum in the unit interval at no recursive
real number (Specker, 1959). This has implications for the principle
of least action. (3) There exists a real number r such that G(r) = 0
is recursively undecidable for G(x) in a class of functions which in-
volves polynomials and the sine function (Wang, 1974). This, again,
has some bearing on the principle of least action. (4) There exist
incomputable solutions of the wave equations for computable initial
values (Pour-El & Richards, 1989; Bridges, 1999). (5) On the ba-
sis of theorems of recursive analysis (Scarpellini, 1963; Richardson,
1968), many questions in dynamical systems theory are provable un-
decidable (Hirsch, 1985; da Costa et al., 1993; Stewart, 1991; Calude
et al., 2010).
10.3 Deterministic chaos
The wording deterministic chaos appears to be a contradictio in ad-
jecto, indicating a hybrid form of chaotic behavior in deterministic
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systems (Lichtenberg & Lieberman, 1983; Anishchenko et al., 2007).
Operationally, it is characterized by the practical impossibility of
forecasting the future because the system is unstable (Lyapunov,
1992) and very sensitive to tiny variations of the initial state. Be-
cause the initial state can only be determined with finite accuracy,
its evolution will soon become totally unpredictable.
10.3.1 Instabilities in classical motion
In 1885 King Oscar II of Sweden and Norway, stimulated by Weier-
strass, Hermite, and Mittag-Leffler, offered a prize to anybody con-
tributing toward the solution of the so-called n-body problem (Weier-
strass et al., 1885, 2):
Given a system of arbitrarily many mass points that at-
tract each according to Newton’s law, try to find, under
the assumption that no two points ever collide, a repre-
sentation of the coordinates of each point as a series in
a variable that is some known function of time and for
all of whose values the series converges uniformly.
The prize-winning work was expected to render systematic tech-
niques toward a solution to stable motion such that systems whose
states start out close together will stay close together forever (Di-
acu & Holmes, 1996, 69). To everyone’s surprise, the exciting course
of events (Peterson, 1993; Diacu, 1996; Diacu & Holmes, 1996) re-
sulted in Poincaré’s prize-winning centennial revised contribution
(Poincaré, 1890), which predicted unexpected and irreducible in-
stabilities in the mechanical motion of bodies. Poincaré was led to
the conclusion that sometimes small variations in the initial state
could lead to huge variations in the evolution of a physical system
at later times. In Poincaré’s own words (Poincaré, 1914, chapt. 4,
sect. 2, 56–57):
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If we would know the laws of nature and the state of
the Universe precisely for a certain time, we would be
able to predict with certainty the state of the Universe
for any later time. But . . . it can be the case that small
differences in the initial values produce great differences
in the later phenomena; a small error in the former may
result in a large error in the latter. The prediction be-
comes impossible and we have a “random phenomenon.”
Note that Poincaré adheres to a Laplacian-type determinism but
recognizes the possibility that systems whose states start out close
together will stay close together for a while (Diacu & Holmes, 1996,
69) and then diverge into totally different behaviors. Today such
behaviors are subsumed under the name deterministic chaos. In
chaotic systems, it is practically impossible to specify the initial
value precise enough to allow long-term predictions.
Already in 1873, Maxwell mentioned (Campbell & Garnett,
1882, 211-212)
When an infinitely small variation in the present state
may bring about a finite difference in the state of the
system in a finite time, the condition of the system is
said to be unstable. It is manifest that the existence of
unstable conditions renders impossible the prediction of
future events, if our knowledge of the present state is
only approximate, and not accurate.
Maxwell also discussed unstable states of high potential energy
whose spontaneous (Frank, 1932) decay or change (Campbell &
Garnett, 1882, 212) “requires an expenditure of work, which in cer-
tain cases may be infinitesimally small, and in general bears no
definite proportion to the energy developed in consequence thereof.”
Today, after more than a century of research into unstable
chaotic motion, symbolic dynamics identified the Poincaré map near
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a homocyclic orbit, the horseshoe map (Smale, 1967), and the shift
map as equivalent origins of classical deterministic chaotic motion,
which is characterized by a computable evolution law and the sen-
sitivity and instability with respect to variations of the initial value
(Shaw, 1981; Lichtenberg & Lieberman, 1983; Anishchenko et al.,
2007).
This scenario can be demonstrated by considering the shift
map σ as it pushes up dormant information residing in the suc-
cessive bits of the initial state represented by the sequence s =
0.(bit 1)(bit 2)(bit 3) · · · , thereby truncating the bits before the
comma; that is, σ(s) = 0.(bit 2)(bit 3)(bit 4) · · · , σ(σ(s)) =
0.(bit 3)(bit 4)(bit 5) · · · , and so on. Suppose a measurement de-
vice operates with a precision of, say, two bits after the comma, indi-
cated by a two bit window of measurability; thus intially all informa-
tion beyond the second bit after the comma is hidden to the exper-
imenter. Consider two initial states s = [0.(bit 1)(bit 2)](bit 3) · · ·
and s′ = [0.(bit 1)(bit 2)](bit 3)′ · · · , where the square brackets in-
dicate the boundaries of the window of measurability (two bits in
this case). Initially, as the representations of both states start with
the same two bits after the comma [0.(bit 1)(bit 2)], these states
appear operationally identical and cannot be discriminated experi-
mentally. Suppose further that, after the second bit, when com-
pared, the successive bits (bit i) and (bit i)′ in both state rep-
resentations at identical positions i = 3, 4, . . . are totally inde-
pendent and uncorrelated. After just two iterations of the shift
map σ, s and s′ may result in totally different, diverging ob-
servables σ(σ(s)) = [0.(bit 3)(bit 4)](bit 5) · · · and σ(σ(s′)) =
[0.(bit 3)′(bit 4)′](bit 5)′ · · · .
If the initial values are defined to be elements of a continuum,
then almost all (of measure one) of them are not representable by
any algorithmically compressible number; in short, they are random
(Martin-Löf, 1966; Calude, 2002). Classical deterministic chaos re-
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sults from the assumption of such a random initial value – drawn
somehow [one needs the axiom of choice (Wagon, 1986; Svozil,
1995b) for doing this] from the continuum urn – and the unfold-
ing of the information contained therein by a recursively enumer-
able (computable), deterministic (temporal evolution) function. Of
course, if one restricts the initial values to finite sets, or, say, to the
rationals, then the behavior will be periodic. The randomness of
classical, deterministic chaos resides in the assumption of the con-
tinuum; an assumption which might be considered a convenience
(for the sake of applying the infinitesimal calculus), as it is difficult
to conceive of any convincing physical operational evidence support-
ing the full structure of continua. If the continuum assumption is
dropped, then what remains is Maxwell’s and Poincaré’s observa-
tion of the unpredictability of the behavior of a deterministic system
due to instabilities and diverging evolutions from almost identical
initial states (Lyapunov, 1992).
10.3.2 Rate of convergence
The connections between symbolic dynamical systems and universal
computation result in provable unknowables (da Costa et al., 1993;
Stewart, 1991). These symbolic dynamic unknowables are different
in type from the dynamical instabilities, and should be interpreted
recursion theoretically, as outlined in Section 10.2.2.
Let us come back to the original n-body problem. About one
hundred years after its formulation, as quoted earlier, the n-body
problem has been solved (Babadzanjanz, 1969, 1979; Wang, 1991;
Diacu, 1996; Wang, 2001; Babadzanjanz, 1993; Babadzanjanz &
Sarkissian, 2006). The three-body problem was already solved by
Sundman (1912). The solutions are given in terms of convergent
power series.
Yet, to be practically applicable, the rate of convergence of the
series must be computable and even reasonably good. One might
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already expect from symbolic dynamics, in particular, from chaotic
motion, that these series solutions could converge very slowly. Even
the short-term prediction of future behaviors may require the sum-
mation of a huge number of terms, making these series unusable for
all practical purposes (Diacu, 1996; Rousseau, 2004).
Alas, the complications regarding convergence may be more se-
rious. Consider a universal computer based on the n-body problem.
This can, for instance, be achieved by ballistic computation, such as
the “Billiard Ball” model of computation (Fredkin & Toffoli, 1982;
Margolus, 2002) that effectively embeds a universal computer into
an n-body system (Svozil, 2007). It follows by reduction that cer-
tain predictions, say, for instance, the general halting problem, are
impossible.
What are the consequences of this reduction for the convergence
of the series solutions? It can be expected that not only do the
series converge very slowly, like in deterministic chaos, but that, in
general, there does not exist any computable rate of convergence
for the series solutions of particular observables. This is very sim-
ilar to the busy beaver function or to Chaitin’s Omega number
(Chaitin, 1987a; Calude, 2002), representing the halting probability
of a universal computer. The Omega number can be enumerated
by series solutions from quasi-algorithms computing its very first
digits (Calude & Dinneen, 2007). Yet, because of the incomputable
growth of the time required to determine whether certain summa-
tion terms corresponding to halting programs possibly contribute,
the series lack any computable rate of convergence.
Though it may be possible to evaluate the state of the n bodies
by Wang’s power series solution for any finite time with a com-
putable rate of convergence, global observables, referring to (re-
cursively) unbounded times, may be incomputable. Examples of
global observables correspond to solutions of certain decision prob-
lems such as the stability of some solar system (we do not claim
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that this is provable incomputable), or the halting problem.
This, of course, stems from the metaphor and robustness of uni-
versal computation and the capacity of the n-bodies to implement
universality. It is no particularity or peculiarity of Wang’s power
series solution. Indeed, the troubles reside in the capacity to imple-
ment substitution, self-reference, universal computation, and Peano
arithmetic by n-body problems. Because of this capacity, there
cannot exist other formalizable methods, analytic solutions, or ap-
proximations capable of deciding and computing certain decision
problems or observables for the n-body problem.
10.4 Quantum unknowables
In addition to provable physical unknowables by reduction to
recursion-theoretic ones, and chaotic symbolic dynamic systems, a
third group of physical unknowables resides in the quantum domain.
Although it has turned out to be a highly successful theory, quan-
tum mechanics, in particular, its interpretation and meaning, has
been controversially received within the physics community. Some
of its founding fathers, like Schrödinger and, in particular, Ein-
stein, considered quantum mechanics to be an unsatisfactory the-
ory: Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (1935; 1938) argued that there
exist counterfactual (Svozil, 2009d; Vaidman, 2007) ways to infer
observables from experiment that, according to quantum mechan-
ics, cannot coexist simultaneously; hence quantum mechanics can-
not predict what experiment can (counterfactually) measure. Thus
quantum mechanics is incomplete and should eventually be sub-
stituted by a more complete theory. Others, among them Born,
Bohr, and Heisenberg, claimed that unknowability in quantum me-
chanics is irreducible, is ontic, and will remain so forever. Over
the years, the latter view seems to have prevailed (Fuchs & Peres,
2000; Bub, 1999), although not totally unchallenged (Jammer, 1966,
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1974, 1992). Already Sommerfeld warned his students not to get
into the meaning behind quantum mechanics, and as mentioned by
Clauser (2002), not long ago, scientists working in that field had
to be very careful not to become discredited as quacks. Richard
Feynman (Feynman, 1965, 129) once mentioned the
perpetual torment that results from [the question], “But
how can it be like that?” which is a reflection of uncon-
trolled but utterly vain desire to see [quantum mechan-
ics] in terms of an analogy with something familiar. . . .
Do not keep saying to yourself, if you can possibly avoid
it, “But how can it be like that?” because you will get
“down the drain,” into a blind alley from which nobody
has yet escaped.
This antirationalistic postulate of irreducible indeterminism and
meaninglessness came after a period of fierce debate on the quan-
tum foundations, followed by decades of vain attempts to complete
quantum mechanics in any operationally testable way, and after the
discovery of proofs of the incompatibility of local, realistic, context-
independent ways to complete quantum mechanics (Clauser & Shi-
mony, 1978; Mermin, 1993).
In what follows, we shall discuss three realms of quantum un-
knowables: (1) randomness of single events, (2) complementarity,
and (3) value indefiniteness.
10.4.1 Random individual events
In 1926, Born (1926b, 866) [see an English translation in Wheeler
& Zurek (1983, 54)] postulated that
“from the standpoint of our quantum mechanics, there
is no quantity which in any individual case causally fixes
the consequence of the collision; but also experimentally
we have so far no reason to believe that there are some
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inner properties of the atom which condition a definite
outcome for the collision. Ought we to hope later to
discover such properties . . . and determine them in in-
dividual cases? Or ought we to believe that the agree-
ment of theory and experiment – as to the impossibility
of prescribing conditions? I myself am inclined to give
up determinism in the world of atoms.”
Furthermore, Born suggested that, though individual particles
behave irreducibly indeterministic, the quantum state evolves de-
terministically in a strictly Laplacian causal way. Indeed, between
(supposedly irreversible) measurements the (unitary) quantum state
evolution is even reversible, that is, one-to-one, and amounts to a
generalized (distance preserving) rotation in complex Hilbert space.
In Born’s (1926a, 804) [see an English translation in Jammer (1989,
302)] own words,
the motion of particles conforms to the laws of probabil-
ity, but the probability itself is propagated in accordance
with the law of causality. [This means that knowledge
of a state in all points in a given time determines the
distribution of the state at all later times.]
This distinction between a reversible, deterministic evolution of
the quantum state, on one hand, and the irreversible measurement,
on the other hand, has left some physicists with an uneasy feeling; in
particular, because of the possibility to erase (Peres, 1980; Scully &
Drühl, 1982; Greenberger & YaSin, 1989; Scully et al., 1991; Zajonc
et al., 1991; Kwiat et al., 1992; Pfau et al., 1994; Chapman et al.,
1995; Herzog et al., 1995) measurements by reconstructing the quan-
tum state, accompanied by a complete loss of the information ob-
tained from the quantum state before the (undone) measurement –
unlike in classical reversible computation (Bennett, 1973, 1982; Leff
& Rex, 1990a), which still allows copying, that is, one-to-many oper-
ations, the quantum state evolution is strictly one-to-one. Indeed,
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the possibility to undo measurements on quantum states appears
to be not bound by any fundamental principle, and limited merely
by the experimenter’s technological capacities. Stated pointedly, it
would in principle be possible to undo all measurements, yet this
cannot be accomplished most of the time (for almost all measure-
ments) for all practical purposes Bell (1992). But then, one could
speculate, Born’s statement seems to suggest that the deterministic
state evolution uniformly prevails. Pointedly stated, if, at least in
principle, there is no such thing as an irreversible measurement, and
the quantum state evolves uniformly deterministically, why should
there exist indeterministic individual events? In this view, the in-
sistence in irreversible measurements as well as in an irreducible
indeterminism associated with individual quantum events appears
to be an idealistic, subjective illusion – in fact, this kind of inde-
terminism depends on measurement irreversibility and decays into
thin air if the latter is denied.
Similar arguments have been brought forth by Everett (1957)
and Schrödinger (1995). Note that it is not entirely clear [and in-
deed remains conventional (Svozil, 2002a)] where exactly the mea-
surement cut (Wigner, 1961; Rössler, 1998) between the observer
and the object is located. By assuming the universal applicability
of quantum mechanics, the object and the measurement apparatus
could be uniformly combined into a larger system whose quantum
mechanical evolution should be deterministic; otherwise quantum
mechanics would not be universally valid. Such frameworks hardly
offer objective opportunities for indeterminism besides subjective
ones – in the many worlds resolution (Everett, 1957), every one
of many simultaneous observers branching off to different universes
subjectively experiences the arbitrariness of the occurrence of events
as indeterminism. (This resembles the perception of a particular se-
quence of bits as compared to all possible ones.)
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Alas, the deterministic evolution of the quantum state could
result in the superposition of classically contradictory states.
One of the mind-boggling, perplexing and counterintuitive conse-
quences associated with this coexistence of classical contradictions
is Schrödinger’s (1935a, 812) cat paradox implying the simultaneous
coexistence of death and life of a macroscopic object such as a mam-
mal. Another one is Everett’s (1957) aforementioned many-worlds
interpretation suggesting that our universe perpetually branches off
into zillions of consistent alternatives.
Thus one is faced with a dilemma: either to accept a somehow
spurious nonuniformity in the evolution of the quantum state dur-
ing (irreversible) measurement processes – an ad hoc assumption
challenged by quantum erasure experiments – or being confronted
with the counterintuitive decay of quantum states into superposi-
tions of classically mutually exclusive states – a sort of jelly – not
backed by our everday experience as conscious beings (although of-
ten ambivalent we usually dont reside in mental ambiguity for too
long). Schrödinger (1995, 19–20) sharply addressed the difficulties
of a quantum theorist coping with this aspect of the quantum for-
malism:
The idea that [the alternate measurement outcomes] be
not alternatives but all really happening simultaneously
seems lunatic to [the quantum theorist], just impossible.
He thinks that if the laws of nature took this form for,
let me say, a quarter of an hour, we should find our
surroundings rapidly turning into a quagmire, a sort
of a featureless jelly or plasma, all contours becoming
blurred, we ourselves probably becoming jelly fish. It is
strange that he should believe this. For I understand he
grants that unobserved nature does behave this way –
namely according to the wave equation. . . . according
to the quantum theorist, nature is prevented from rapid
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jellification only by our perceiving or observing it.
If, however, an additional irreducible irreversible evolution or
some other, possibly environmental (Peres, 1980; Zurek, 2003), ef-
fect associated with measurements (and the collapse of the quan-
tum wave function) is postulated or somehow emerges, individual
events may occur indeterministically. The considerations might ap-
pear to be sophistries, but they have direct consequences for the
supposedly most advanced random number generators of our time.
These devices operate with beam splitters (Svozil, 1990; Rarity
et al., 1994; Jennewein et al., 2000; Stefanov et al., 2000; Wang
et al., 2006; Calude et al., 2010), which are strictly reversible (Ou
et al., 1987; Greenberger et al., 1993; Zeilinger, 1981; Svozil, 2005c)
– one could demonstrate reversibility on beam splitters by forming a
Mach-Zehnder interforemeter with two serially connected ones – or
parametric down-conversions and entanglement (Hai-Qiang et al.,
2004; Fiorentino et al., 2007; Pironio et al., 2010).
Born did not address these questions, nor did he specify the
formal notion of indeterminism to which he was relating. So far,
no mathematical characterization of quantum randomness has been
proved (Calude & Svozil, 2008). In the absence of any indication to
the contrary, it is mostly implicitly assumed that quantum random-
ness is of the strongest possible kind, which amounts to postulating
that the symbolic sequences associated with measurement outcomes
are uncomputable or even algorithmically incompressible.
Indeed, the quantum formalism does not predict the outcome of
single events when there is a mismatch between the context in which
a state was prepared, and the context in which it is measured. Here,
the term context (Svozil, 2009d,a) denotes a maximal collection of
comeasurable observables, or, more technically, the maximal opera-
tor from which all commuting operators can be functionally derived
(Halmos, 1974, sect. 84). Ideally, a quantized system can be pre-
pared to yield exactly one answer in exactly one context (Zeilinger,
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1999; Donath & Svozil, 2002; Svozil, 2002b). Other outcomes as-
sociated with other contexts occur indeterministically (Calude &
Svozil, 2008).
Furthermore, the quantum formalism is incapable of predicting
deterministically the radioactive decay of individual particles. At-
tempts to find causal laws lost steam (Kragh, 1997, 2009) at the
time of Born’s suggestion of the indeterministic interpretation of
individual measurement outcomes, and nobody has come up with a
operationally satisfactory deterministic prediction since then.
In the absence of other explanations, it is not too unreason-
able to pragmatically presume that these single events occur with-
out any causation and thus at random. Presently, this appears to
be the prevalent opinion among physicists. Such random quantum
coin tosses (Svozil, 1990; Rarity et al., 1994; Jennewein et al., 2000;
Stefanov et al., 2000; Hai-Qiang et al., 2004; Wang et al., 2006;
Fiorentino et al., 2007; Svozil, 2009e; Pironio et al., 2010) have
been used for various purposes, such as delayed choice experiments
(Weihs et al., 1998a; Jennewein et al., 2000).
Note that randomness of this type (Calude, 2005; Calude & Din-
neen, 2005) is postulated rather than proved and thus, unless dis-
proved, remains conjectural. This is necessarily so, for any claim of
randomness can only be corroborated relative to, and with respect
to, a more or less large class of laws or behaviors; it is impossible to
inspect the hypothesis against an infinity of – and even less so all
– conceivable laws. To rephrase a statement about computability
(Davis, 1958, 11), how can we ever exclude the possibility of our pre-
sented, some day (perhaps by some extraterrestrial visitors), with
a (perhaps extremely complex) device that computes and predicts
a certain type of hitherto random physical phenomenon?
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10.4.2 Complementarity
Complementarity is the impossibility of measuring two or more com-
plementary observables with arbitrary precision simultaneously. In
1933, Pauli (1958, 7) gave the first explicit definition of complemen-
tarity stating that [see the partial English translation in (Jammer,
1989, 369)]
in the case of an indeterminacy of a property of a sys-
tem at a certain configuration (at a certain state of a
system), any attempt to measure the respective prop-
erty (at least partially) annihilates the influence of the
previous knowledge of the system on the (possibly sta-
tistical) propositions about possible later measurement
results. . . . The impact on the system by the measure-
ment apparatus for momentum (position) is such that
within the limits of the uncertainty relations the value
of the knowledge of the previous position (momentum)
for the prediction of later measurements of position and
momentum is lost.
Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (1935) challenged quantum com-
plementarity (and doubted the completeness of quantum theory)
by utilizing a configuration of two entangled (Schrödinger, 1935a,b,
1936) particles. They claimed to be able to empirically infer two
different complementary contexts counterfactually simultaneously,
thus circumventing quantum complementarity. Thereby, one con-
text is measured on one side of the setup, whereas the other context
is measured on the other side of it. By the uniqueness property
(Svozil, 2006a) of certain two-particle states, knowledge of a prop-
erty of one particle entails the certainty that, if this property were
measured on the other particle as well, the outcome of the measure-
ment would be a unique function of the outcome of the measurement
performed.
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This makes possible the measurement of one context as well as
the simultaneous counterfactual inference of a different complemen-
tary context. Because, one could argue, although one has actually
measured on one side a different, incompatible context compared
to the context measured on the other side, if, on both sides, the
same context would be measured, the outcomes on both sides would
be uniquely correlated. (This can indeed be verified in another ex-
periment.) Hence, the Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen argument
continues, measurement of one context per side is sufficient, for the
outcome could be counterfactually inferred on the other side. Thus,
effectively two complementary contexts are knowable. Based on this
argument, Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen suggested that quantum
mechanics must be considered incomplete, because it cannot predict
what can be measured; thus a more complete theory is needed.
Complementarity was first encountered in quantum mechanics,
but it is a phenomenon also observable in the classical world. To get
better intuition of complementarity, we shall consider generalized
urn models (Wright, 1990, 1978) or, equivalently (Svozil, 2005b),
finite deterministic automata (Moore, 1956; Svozil, 1993; Schaller
& Svozil, 1996; Dvurečenskij et al., 1995; Calude et al., 1997) in
an unknown initial state. Both quasi-classic examples mimic com-
plementarity to the extent that even quasi-quantum cryptography
can be performed with them (Svozil, 2006c) as long as value indef-
initeness is not a feature of the protocol (Bechmann-Pasquinucci
& Peres, 2000; Svozil, 2010a), that is, for instance, the Bennett
and Brassard (1984) protocol (Bennett et al., 1992) can be imple-
mented with generalized urn models, whereas the Ekert protocol
(Ekert, 1991) cannot.
A generalized urn model is characterized by an ensemble of balls
with black background color. Printed on these balls are some color
symbols. Every ball contains just one symbol per color. Further as-
sume some filters or eyeglasses that are perfect because they totally
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absorb light of all other colors but a particular one. In that way,
every color can be associated with a particular pair of eyeglasses
and vice versa.
When a spectator looks at a ball through such a particular pair
of eyeglasses, the only operationally recognizable symbol will be
the one in the particular color that is transmitted through the eye-
glasses. All other colors are absorbed, and the symbols printed on
them will appear black and therefore will not be differentiable from
the black background. Hence the ball will appear to carry a dif-
ferent message or symbol, depending on the color with which it is
viewed.
For the sake of demonstration, let us consider a general-
ized urn model with four ball types, two colors, say red and
green, and two symbols, say “0” and “1,” per color, that is,
ball type 1: (red 0 green 0), ball type 2: (red 0 green 1), ball
type 3: (red 1 green 0), and ball type 4: (red 1 green 1). The
green pair of eyeglasses associated with the green observable allows
the observer to differentiate between ball types 1 or 3 (associated
with the green symbol “0”), and ball types 2 or 4 (associated with
the green symbol “1”). The red pair of eyeglasses associated with
the red observable allows the observer to differentiate between ball
types 1 or 2 (associated with the green symbol “0”), and ball types
3 or 4 (associated with the green symbol “1”). [Without going into
details in general this yields sets of partitions of the set of ball types
resulting in partition logics (Svozil, 1993, chapt. 10).]
The difference between the balls and the quanta is the possibil-
ity of viewing all the different symbols on the balls in all different
colors by taking off the eyeglasses; also, one can consecutively look
at one and the same ball with differently colored pair of eyeglasses,
thereby identifying the ball completely. Quantum mechanics does
not provide us with a possibility to look across the quantum veil, as
it allows neither a global, simultaneous measurement of all comple-
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mentary observables nor a measurement of one observable without
disturbing the measurement of another complimentary observable
(with the exception of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen counterfactual
measurements discussed earlier). On the contrary, there are strong
formal arguments suggesting that the assumption of a simultane-
ous physical coexistence of such complementary observables yields
a complete contradiction. These issues will be discussed next.
10.4.3 Value indefiniteness versus omniscience
Still another quantum unknowable results from the fact that no
global (in the sense of all or at least certain finite sets of com-
plementary observables) classical truth assignment exists which is
consistent with even a finite number of local (in the sense of comea-
surable) ones, that is, no consistent classical truth table can be
given by pasting together the possible outcomes of measurements
of certain complementary observables. This phenomenon is also
known as value indefiniteness or, by an option to interpret this re-
sult, contextuality (see later). Here the term local refers to a partic-
ular context (Svozil, 2009a) that, operationally, should be thought
of as the collection of all comeasurable or copreparable (Zeilinger,
1999) observables. The structure of quantum propositions (Birkhoff
& von Neumann, 1936; Kochen & Specker, 1965; Kalmbach, 1983,
1986; Pták & Pulmannová, 1991; Navara & Rogalewicz, 1991; Svozil,
1998) can be obtained by pasting contexts together.
As by definition, only one such context is directly measurable,
arguments based on more than one context must necessarily involve
counterfactuals (Svozil, 2009d; Vaidman, 2007). A counterfactual
is a would-be-observable or contrary-to-fact conditional (Chisholm,
1946) which has not been measured but potentially could have been
measured if an observer would have decided to do so; alas the ob-
server decided to measure a different, presumably complementary,
observable.
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Already scholastic philosophy, for instance, Thomas Aquinas,
considered similar questions such as whether God has knowledge of
non-existing things (Aquinas, 1981, part one, question 14, article
9) or things that are not yet (Aquinas, 1981, part one, question
14, article 13); see also Specker’s (1960, 243) reference to infutura-
bilities. Classical omniscience, at least its naive expression that,
if a proposition is true, then an omniscient agent (such as God)
knows that it is true, is plagued by controversies and paradoxes.
Even without evoking quantum mechanics, there exist bounds on
omniscience because of the self-referential perception of intrinsic ob-
servers endowed with free will: if such an observer is omniscient and
has absolute predictive power, then free will could counteract omni-
science and, in particular, the observer’s own predictions. Within a
consistent formal framework, the only alternative is to either aban-
don free will, stating that it is an idealistic illusion, or accept that
omniscience and absolute predictive power is bound by paradoxical
self-reference.
The empirical sciences implement classical omniscience by as-
suming that in principle, all observables of classical physics are
comeasurable without any restrictions, regardless of whether they
are actually measured. No ontological distinction is made between
an observable obtained by an actual and a potential or counter-
factual measurement. [In contrast, compare Schrödinger’s (1935a,
sect. 7) own epistemological interpretation of the wave function as a
catalog of expectations.] Classically, precision and comeasurability
are limited only by the technical capacities of the experimenter. The
principle of empirical classical omniscience has given rise to the real-
istic believe that all observables exist regardless of their observation,
that is, regardless and independent of any particular measurement.
Physical (co-)existence is thereby related to the realistic assump-
tion [sometimes referred to as the “ontic” (Atmanspacher & Primas,
2005) viewpoint] that (Stace, 1934) “some entities sometimes exist
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without being experienced by any finite mind.” With regards to
such unexperienced counterfactual entities, Stace (1934, 364, 365,
368) questions their existence (compare also Schrödinger’s remark
quoted earlier):
In front of me is a piece of paper. I assume that the real-
ist believes that this paper will continue to exist when it
is put away in my desk for the night, and when no finite
mind is experiencing it. . . . I will state clearly at the
outset that I cannot prove that no entities exist without
being experienced by minds. For all I know completely
unexperienced entities may exist, but what I shall assert
is that . . . there is absolutely no reason for asserting that
these non-mental, or physical, entities ever exist except
when they are being experienced, and the proposition
that they do so exist is utterly groundless and gratu-
itous, and one which ought not to be believed. . . . As
regards [a] unicorn on Mars, the correct position, as far
as logic is concerned, is obviously that if anyone asserts
that there is a unicorn there, the onus is on him to prove
it; and that until they do prove it, we ought not to be-
lieve that they exist.
One might criticize Stace’s idealistic position by responding that
suppose an experimenter can choose which observable among a col-
lection of different, complementary, observables is actually mea-
sured. Regardless of this choice, a measurement of any observable
that could be measured would produce some result. This contrary-
to-fact conditional could be interpreted as an existing element of
physical reality. Furthermore, according to the argument of Ein-
stein, Podolsky and Rosen (1935, 777), even certain sets of comple-
mentary counterfactual elements of physical reality coexist “if, with-
out in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty
(i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value of [these] physical
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quantit[ies].” The idealist might repond that these arguments are
unconvincing because they are merely based on conterfactual infer-
ence and are thus empirically “utterly groundless and gratuitous.”
The formal expression of classical omniscience is the Boolean
algebra of observable propositions (Boole, 1958), in particular the
abundance of two-valued states interpretable as omniscience about
the system. Thereby, any such dispersionless quasi-classical two-
valued state – associated with a truth assignment – can be defined
for all observables, regardless of whether they have been actually
observed.
After the discovery of complementarity, a further indication
against quantum omniscience came from Boole’s (1862) conditions
of possible (classical) experience which are bounds for the occur-
rence of (classical) events that are derivable within classical prob-
ability theory (Pitowsky, 1989a,b, 1994; Pitowsky & Svozil, 2001)
for quantum probabilities and quantum expectation functions. Bell
(1966) pointed out that experiments based on counterfactually in-
ferred observables discussed by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (1935)
discussed earlier violate these conditions of possible (classical) ex-
perience and thus seem to indicate the impossibility of a faithful
embedding (i.e., preserving the logical structure) of quantum ob-
servables into classical Boolean algebras. Stated pointedly, under
some (presumably mild) side assumptions, unperformed experiments
have no results (Peres, 1978); that is, there cannot exist a table
enumerating all actual and hypothetical context independent (see
later) experimental outcomes consistent with the observed quan-
tum frequencies (Weihs et al., 1998b; Svozil, 2010b). As any such
table could be interpreted as omniscience with respect to the observ-
ables in the Boole-Bell-Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-type experiments,
the impossibility to consistently enumerate such tables (under the
noncontextual assumption) appears to be a very serious indication
against omniscience in the quantum domain.
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The quantum nonlocal (i.e., the particles are spatially sepa-
rated) correlations among observables in the Boole-Bell-Einstein-
Podolsky-Rosen-type experiments are stronger than classical in the
sense that ex post facto, when the two outcomes are communicated
and compared, in the case of dichotomic observables, say “0” and
“1,” for some measurement parameter regions, there appear to be
more equal occurrences “00” or “11” and thus fewer unequal occur-
rences “01” or “10” than could be classically accounted for; likewise,
for other measurement parameter regions, there appear to be fewer
equal occurrences “00” or “11” and thus more unequal occurrences
“01” or “10” than could be classically accounted for. These conclu-
sions can only be drawn in retrospect, that is, after bringing together
and comparing the outcomes. Individual outcomes occur indeter-
ministically and, in particular, independently of the measurement
parameter regions [but not of outcomes (Shimony, 1984)] of other
distant, measurements. No faster-than-light signaling can occur.
Indeed, even stronger-than-quantum correlations would, in this sce-
nario, not violate relativistic causality (Popescu & Rohrlich, 1994,
1997; Krenn & Svozil, 1998; Svozil, 2005a).
The reason that it is impossible to describe all quantum observ-
ables simultaneously by classical tables of experimental outcomes
can be understood in terms of a stronger conclusion that, for quan-
tum systems whose Hilbert space is of dimension greater than two,
there does not exist any dispersionless quasi-classical, two-valued
state interpretable as truth assignment. This conclusion, which is
known as the Kochen-Specker theorem (Specker, 1960; Kochen &
Specker, 1967; Zierler & Schlessinger, 1965; Alda, 1980, 1981; Kam-
ber, 1964, 1965; Mermin, 1993; Svozil, 1998; Svozil & Tkadlec, 1996;
Cabello et al., 1996; Svozil, 2009a), has a finitistic proof by contra-
diction. Proofs of the Kochen-Specker theorem amount to brain
teasers in graph coloring resulting in the fact that, for the geomet-
ric configurations considered, there does not exist any possibility
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to consistently and context independently enumerate and tabulate
the values of all the observables occurring in a Kochen-Specker-type
argument (Cabello et al., 1996).
The violations of conditions of possible classical experience in
Boole-Bell-type experiments or the Kochen-Specker theorem do not
exclude realism restricted to a single context but (noncontextual)
realistic omniscience beyond it. It may thus not be totally unreason-
able to suspect that the assumption of (pre-)determined observables
outside a single context may be unjustified (Svozil, 2004).
If one nevertheless insists in the simultaneous physical coexis-
tence of counterfactual observables, any forced tabulation (Peres,
1978; Svozil, 2010b) of truth values for Boole-Bell-type or Kochen-
Specker-type configurations would either result in a complete con-
tradiction or in context dependence, also termed contextuality, that
is, the outcome of a measurement of an observable would depend
on what other comeasurable observables are measured alongside it
(Bohr, 1949; Bell, 1966; Heywood & Redhead, 1983; Redhead, 1990;
Svozil, 2009a).
Indeed, the current mainstream interpretation of the Boole-Bell-
type or Kochen-Specker-type theorems is in terms of contextuality,
that is, by assuming a dependence of the outcome of a single ob-
servable on what other observables are actually measured or at least
what could have been consistently known alongside it. This in-
sistence in the coexistence of complementary observables could be
interpreted as an attempt to rescue classical omniscience accompa-
nied by ontological realism at the price of accepting contextuality.
The realist Bell (1966, 451) suggested that “the result of an obser-
vation may reasonably depend . . . on the complete disposition of
the apparatus.” (Already Bohr (1949) mentioned “the impossibility
of any sharp separation between the behaviour of atomic objects
and the interaction with the measuring instruments which serve to
define the conditions under which the phenomena appear.”)
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For the sake of demonstrating contextuality (Svozil, 2010b) con-
sider a dichotomic observable (with outcomes “0” or “1”). Contex-
tuality predicts that, when measured together with some particular
set of observables, this observable yields a certain outcome, say “0,”
whereas when measured together with another, complementary, set
of other observables, the observable may yield a different outcome,
say “1.”
However, statistically the quantum probability and expectation
value of this observable is noncontextual and thus independent of the
set of co-observables. Thus contextuality is a hypothetical (coun-
terfactual) phenomenon regarding complementary measurements on
an individual particle, making it inaccessible for direct tests. Alas,
as far as Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-type measurements might repro-
duce such contextual behavior for individual particles, quantum me-
chanics predicts noncontextuality (Svozil, 2009c) and thus contra-
dicts the assumption of quantum contextuality. (Often claims of
experimental evidence of quantum contextuality do not deal with
its individual particle character but deal with statistical violations of
Boole-Bell-type or Kochen-Specker-type configurations. The terms
which contribute to (in)equalities are not measured on one and the
same particle; operationally they even originate in very different
measurement setups.) One may argue that contextuality occurs
only when absolutely necessary, that is, when the set of observ-
ables allows only an insufficient number of two-valued states for a
homeomorphic embedding into (classical) Boolean algebras; but in
view of the fact that quantum noncontextuality for single events
occurs for configurations which can be pasted together to construct
a Kochen-Specker-type scheme, any such argument might appear
ad hoc..
On the basis of the aforementioned lack of quantum omniscience,
it is possible to postulate the existence of absolute sources of inde-
terminism; if there are no (preexisting) observables, and no causal
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laws yielding individual outcomes, the occurrence of any such out-
come can only be unpredictable and incomputable (Calude & Svozil,
2008). This quantum dice approach has first been proposed (Svozil,
1990; Rarity et al., 1994; Zeilinger, 1999) and realized (Jennewein
et al., 2000; Stefanov et al., 2000; Hai-Qiang et al., 2004; Wang
et al., 2006) in setups which utilize complementarity, yet still al-
low omniscience. More recently, it was suggested (Svozil, 2009e;
Pironio et al., 2010) to utilize quantum systems with more than
two exclusive outcomes that are are subject to value indefiniteness
(two-dimensional systems cannot be proven to be value indefinite).
The additional advantage over devices utilizing merely complemen-
tarity is that these new type of quantum oracles (Fiorentino et al.,
2007; Paterek et al., 2010; Pironio et al., 2010) are “quantum me-
chanically certified” by Boole-Bell-type, Kochen-Specker-type, and
Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger-type (Greenberger et al., 1990) theo-
rems not to allow omniscience. Of course, all these devices operate
under the assumption that there are no hidden variables that could
complete the quantum mechanical description of nature, especially
no contextual ones, as well as no quasi-indeterminism caused by
environmental influences [such as in the context translation prin-
ciple (Svozil, 2004)]. Thus, ultimately, these sources of quantum
randomness are grounded in our belief that quantum mechanics is
the most complete representation of physical phenomenology.
10.5 Miracles due to gaps in causal de-
scription
A different issue, discussed by Frank (1932), is the possible occur-
rence of miracles in the presence of gaps of physical determinism.
Already Maxwell has considered singular points (Campbell & Gar-
nett, 1882, 212–213), “where prediction, except from absolutely per-
fect data, and guided by the omniscience of contingency, becomes
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impossible.” One might perceive individual events occurring outside
the validity of classical and quantum physics without any apparent
cause as miracles. For if there is no cause to an event, why should
such an event occur altogether rather than not occur?
Although such thoughts remain highly speculative, miracles
could be the basis for an operator-directed evolution in otherwise
deterministic physical systems. Similar models have been applied to
dualistic models of the mind (Popper & Eccles, 1977; Eccles, 1986,
1990). The objection that this scenario is unnecessarily complicat-
ing an otherwise monistic model should be carefully reevaluated in
view of computer-generated virtual realities (Descartes, 1641; Put-
nam, 1981; Svozil, 1995a). In such algorithmic universes, there
are computable evolution laws as well as inputs from interfaces.
From the intrinsic perspective (Svozil, 1994), the inputs cannot be
causally accounted for, and hence they remain irreducibly transcen-
dental with respect to the otherwise algorithmic universe.
10.6 Concluding thoughts
10.6.1 Metaphysical status of (in)determinism
Hilbert’s (1902) sixth problem is about the axiomatization of
physics. Regardless of whether this goal is achievable, omniscience
cannot be gained via the formalized, syntactic route, which will
remain blocked forever by the paradoxical self-reference to which
intrinsic observers and operational methods are bound. Even if
the universe were a computer (Zuse, 1970; Fredkin, 1990; Wol-
fram, 2002; Svozil, 2006b), we would intrinsically experience un-
predictability and complementarity.
With regard to conjectures about the (in)deterministic evolution
of physical events, the situation is unsettled and can be expected
to remain unsettled forever. The reason for this is the provable
impossibility to formally prove (in)determinism: it is not possible to
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ensure that physical behaviors are causal and will remain so forever,
nor is it possible to exclude all causal behaviors.
The postulate of indeterministic behavior in physics or elsewhere
is impossible to prove by considering a finite operationally obtained
encoded phenotype such as a finite sequence of (supposedly ran-
dom) bits from physical experiments alone. Furthermore, recursion
theory and algorithmic information theory (Chaitin, 1987a; Calude,
2002; Grünwald & Vitányi, 1987) imply that an unbounded system
of axioms is required to prove the unbounded algorithmic informa-
tion content of an unbounded symbolic sequence. There also exist
irreducible complexities in pure mathematics (Chaitin, 2004, 2007).
The opportunistic approach that (as historically, many ingenious
scientists have failed to come up with a causal description) indeter-
minism will prevail appears to be anecdotal, at best, and misleading,
at worst. Likewise, the advice of authoritative researchers to avoid
asking questions related to completing a theory, or to avoid thinking
about the meaning of quantum mechanics or any kind of rational in-
terpretation, and to avoid searching for causal laws for phenomena
which are, at the same time, postulated to occur indeterministi-
cally by the same authorities – even wisely and benevolently posted
– hardly qualify as proof.
Any kind of lawlessness can thus be claimed only with reference
to, and relative to, certain criteria, laws, or quantitative statistical
or algorithmic tests. For instance, randomness could be established
merely with respect to certain tests, such as some batteries of tests of
randomness, for instance, diehard (Marsaglia, 1995), NIST (Rukhin
et al., 2001), TestU01 (L’Ecuyer & Simard, 2007), or algorithmic
(Calude & Dinneen, 2005; Calude et al., 2010) tests. Note, how-
ever, that even the decimal expansion of pi, the ratio between the
circumference and the diameter of an ideal circle (Bailey et al., 1997;
Bailey & Borwein, 2005), behaves reasonably random (Calude et al.,
2010); pi might even be a good source of randomness for many Monte
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Carlo calculations.
Thus, both from a formal as well as from an operational point
of view, any rational investigation into, or claim of, absolute
(in)determinism is metaphysical and can only be proved relative to
a limited number of statistical or algorithmic tests which some spe-
cialists happen to choose; with very limited validity for the formal
and the natural sciences.
10.6.2 Harnessing unknowables and indetermin-
ism
Physical indeterminism need not necessarily be perceived negatively
as the absence of causal laws but rather as a valuable resource. In-
deed, ingenious quasi-programs to compute the halting probability
(Chaitin, 1987a; Calude & Dinneen, 2007; Calude & Chaitin, 2007)
through summation of series without any computable rate of con-
vergence could, at least in principle, and in the limit of unbounded
computational resources, be interpreted as generating provable ran-
dom sequences. However, as has already been expressed by von
Neumann (1951, 768), “anyone who considers arithmetical methods
of producing random digits is, of course, in a state of sin.”
Besides recursion-theoretic undecidability, there appear to be
at least two principal sources of indeterminism and randomness in
physics: (1) one scenario is associated with instabilities of classical
physical systems and with a strong dependence of future behaviors
on the initial value, and (2) quantum indeterminism, which can be
subdivided into three subcategories, including random outcomes of
individual events, complementarity, and value indefiniteness.
The production of random numbers by physical generators has a
long history (The RAND Corporation, 1955). The similarities and
differences between classical and quantum randomness can be con-
ceptualized in terms of two black boxes: the first of them, called the
“Poincaré box,” containing a classical, deterministic, chaotic source
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of randomness and the second, called the “Born box,” containing a
quantum source of randomness.
A Poincaré box could be realized by operating a classical dy-
namical system in the shift map region. Major principles for Born
boxes utilizing beam splitters or parametric down conversion include
the following: (1) there should be at least three mutually exclusive
outcomes to ensure value indefiniteness (Bechmann-Pasquinucci &
Peres, 2000; Calude & Svozil, 2008; Svozil, 2009e; Paterek et al.,
2010; Pironio et al., 2010); (2) the states prepared and measured
should be pure and in mutually [possibly interlinked (Svozil, 2009c)]
unbiased bases or contexts; and (3) events should be independent to
be able to apply proper normalization procedures (von Neumann,
1951; Samuelson, 1968).
Suppose an agent is being presented with both boxes without
any label on, or hint about, them; that is, the origin of indeter-
minism is unknown to the agent. In a modified Turing test, an
agent’s task would be to find out which is the Born and which is
the Poincaré box solely by observing their output. In the absence
of any criteria, there should not exist any operational method or
procedure capable of discriminating among these boxes. Moreover,
both types of indeterminism appear to be based on speculative as-
sumptions: in the classical case, it is the existence of continua and
the possibility to randomly choose elements thereof, representing
the initial values; in the quantum case, it is the irreducible indeter-
minism of single events.
10.6.3 Personal remarks
It is perpetually amazing, perplexing and mind-boggling how many
laws and mathematical formæ can be found to express and program
or induce physical behavior with high precision. There definitely
is substance to the Pythagorean belief that, at least in a restricted
manner, nature is numbers and God computes; maybe also throwing
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dice sometimes.
The apparent impossibility to explain certain phenomena by any
causal law should be perceived carefully and cautiously in a historic,
transient perspective. The author has the impression that in their
attempts to canonize beliefs in the irreducible randomness of (quan-
tum) mechanics, many physicists, philosophers, and communicators
may have prematurely thrown out a thorough rationalistic world-
view with the provably unfounded claims of total omniscience and
omnipotence.
Let me sketch some very speculative attempts to undo the Gori-
dan Knot that haunts the perception of randomness in the classical
and quantum domains in recent times. (1) Gödel-Turing-Tarski-
type undecidability will remain with us forever, at least as long one
allows substitution, self-reference, and universal computation. (2)
Most classical as well quantum unknowables might be epistemic
and not ontic. (3) The classical continua might be convenient
abstractions that will have to be abandoned in favor of granular,
course-graining structures eventually. As a consequence, classical
randomness originating from deterministic chaos might turn out to
be formally computable but for all practical purposes impossible
to predict. (4) Space and time might turn out to be intrinsic con-
structions to represent dichotomic events in a world dominated by
one-to-one state evolution. (5) There might only exist pure quan-
tum states that can be associated with a unique (measurement and
preparation) context. Mixed quantum states might turn out to be
purely epistemic, that is, based on our ignorance of the pure state
we are dealing with. (6) Kochen-Specker and Boole-Bell-type ar-
guments should be interpreted to indicate value indefiniteness be-
yond a single context. The idea that there is physical existence
beyond a single context at a time (and, associated with it, contex-
tuality) might be misleading. (7) Quantum randomness originate
in the process of context translation between different, mismatching
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preparation and measurement contexts. It might thus be induced
by the environment of the measurement apparatus and our techno-
logic inability to maintain universal coherence. (8) Dualistic opera-
tor controlled scenarios might present an option that are consistent
or at least in peaceful coexistence with a certain type of determinism
(leaving room for miracles or gaps of causality). The information
flow from and through the interface might either be experienced as
miracle, or, within the statistical bounds, as incomputable event or
input. Whether these specutations and feelings are justified only
generations to come will know.
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